According to Frege, neither a demonstrative nor an indexical is a singular term; only a demonstrative (indexical) together with 'circumstances accompanying its utterance' has sense and singular reference. While this view seems defensible for demonstratives, where demonstrations serve as non-verbal signs, indexicals, especially pure indexicals like 'I', 'here', and 'now', seem not to be in need of completion by circumstances of utterance. In this paper I argue on the basis of independent reasons that indexicals are in fact in need of completion, identify the completers as uses of circumstances of utterance by the speaker, and show how these uses together with the utterance of indexical sentences express of thoughts. The starting point of the paper is a criticism of Kripke's and Künne's alternative treatment of indexicals in Frege's framework.
Introduction: are indexicals hybrid proper names?
Frege held that in a language apt for scientific employment the 'mere wording' of a univocal assertoric sentence is the complete expression of a thought (Frege 1913, p. 23 [p. 230] ). For instance, understanding the words that compose the sentence 'Every natural number has exactly one successor' and knowing their mode of composition suffices for grasping the thought expressed. The thought expressed is a complex sense 'for which the question of truth arises' (Frege 1918-19, p. 62 [p. 292] ).
1 Now the mere wording of many sentences in natural language is not the complete expression of a thought. Important examples are sentences that contain indexicals and demonstratives. Understanding the words that compose the sentence 'That dog is dangerous' and having knowledge of their mode of composition does not suffice for grasping the thought expressed by an utterance of this sentence. What does one need to know in addition to the mere wording in order to grasp the thought expressed by an utterance of such a sentence? Frege answers this question as follows:
[T]he mere wording, as it can be written down, is not the complete expression of the thought; the knowledge of certain [circumstances] accompanying the utterance, which are used as means of expressing the thought, is needed for us to grasp the thought correctly. Pointing the finger, hand gestures, glances, may belong here too. (Frege 1918-19, p. 64 [p. 296] ; in part my translation)
Sentences with indexicals and demonstratives express thoughts only if supplemented with the circumstances of their utterance, used by the speaker as means of thought-expression. For example, the purely verbal sign 'that dog' is not a singular term; only the hybrid proper name that contains these words combined with a gesture that points out a particular dog is a singular term (Frege 1914, p. 230 [p. 213] ). Following Künne's terminology, I will call any singular term that contains words and circumstances of utterance a hybrid proper name.
The idea that utterances of demonstratives contain hybrid proper names is an intriguing suggestion that is of independent interest for a philosophical view of demonstratives (Textor 2007) . Finger pointings, hand gestures, and glances are non-verbal signs by means of which a speaker, in part, expresses a thought. 2 Why is, for example, a particular glance a non-verbal sign? Because it is an action made with communicative intentions, and as such it can be understood or misunderstood (Millikan 2004, p. 144) . This observation guides semantic theorizing about demonstratives: neither verbal nor non-verbal signs are parameters of the context of utterance. Hence, pointings, and other non-verbal signs,
are not context-parameters (cf. Salmon 2002, p. 517) .
The Fregean view of demonstratives assumes that the circumstances that complete a hybrid proper name are non-verbal signs. But Frege takes, for instance, the indexical 'now' also to be a hybrid proper name, and claims that the time of speaking is part of the thoughtexpression (Frege 1918-19, p. 76 [p. 309] ). It seems natural to say further that the circumstances that complete 'here' and 'I' are the location and the producer of the utterance.
However, the speaker, the time of utterance, and so forth are not non-verbal signs that have meaning (Textor 2007, p. 953) . Hence, the view that the completing circumstances are nonverbal signs seems not to apply to indexicals. Can one in view of this observation hold on to the idea that non-verbal signs complete the utterance of a hybrid proper name and do justice to the Fregean idea that both indexicals and demonstratives are hybrid proper names? Kripke (2008, pp. 201ff.) answers 'Yes' to our question. He holds that in order to obtain a complete thought-expression the mere wording of an indexical (demonstrative) sentence must be completed by a 'piece of language'. Since, for example, the time at which 'It is raining' is uttered completes the sentence to the expression of a thought, Kripke concludes that the time of utterance is an 'unrecognised piece of language', an autonymous designator (Kripke 2008, p. 202, n. 60; p. 203, n. 62 ).
Künne (2010) If a time indication is needed by the present tense one must know when the sentence was uttered to apprehend the thought correctly. Therefore the time of utterance is part of the expression of the thought. (Frege 1918-19, p. 64 [p. 296]; p. 76 [p. 309]) Frege assumes that knowledge of the time of utterance and the meaning of the present-tense sentence suffices for grasping the thought expressed. Hence, the mere wording of the sentence together with the time of utterance expresses a thought completely.
Kripke takes his cue from this passage in Frege. Only 'pieces of language' can be parts of thought-expressions. Since the time of utterance is part of the expression of a thought, it must be an autonymous designator. He (2008, p. 212 ) models the first-person pronoun and 'here', etc., on the present tense: places and people are also autonymous
designators. An indexical is an incomplete function expression that is completed by an autonymous designator to a singular term. One can specify general reference rules for pairs of indexicals and autonymous designators as follows:
(∀t) (<'now', t> refers to t) (∀p) (<'here', p> refers to p) (∀s) (<'I', s> refers to s)
Kripke models the complete expression of a thought as an ordered pair consisting of an indexical sentence and the time (location, producer) of utterance. For instance, (S1) <'It is raining in London', 12.6.2013, 14 .33> expresses a complete thought (Kripke 2008, p. 204). 6 One can represent hybrid thought-expressions differently, but in the following I will use Kripke's symbolism.
Künne rejects the thesis that indexicals are function expressions, but he arrives at the same conclusion:
[T]he result of combining a word or phrase with a time, a place, a speaker or an act of demonstration is a singular term that by itself designates something. (Künne 2010, p. 545)
The object designated by such a hybrid singular term is its non-verbal part.
I will call the view that (a) indexicals such as 'I', 'here', and 'now' need to be completed by a speaker etc. in order to obtain singular terms and (b) sentences containing such indexicals need to be completed by such objects in order to obtain thought-expressions the Object View.
The Object View raises two basic questions. First, Kripke defines reference for ordered pairs of objects and indexicals; rules like (I1) take the same objects to be parameters of the reference relation for indexicals. Both rules are equivalent: the hybrid proper name <'I', Claudius> refers to Claudius if, and only if, 'I' refers with respect to a context of utterance whose speaker is Claudius. But (I1) neither suggests that the speaker is an autonymous designator nor something that contributes to the expression of a thought. Hence, one will ask:
Can it make any difference whether we say that a word plus a context designates a given object, or instead that the word designates the object 'relative to' or 'with respect to' the context? (Salmon 2002, p. 563) If it does not make a difference, the Object View threatens either to be a mere notational variant of the standard view or to be unmotivated. Künne (2010, p. 533) Kripke proposes a response to this problem. In order to understand a sign one must at least perceive it; he talks of acquaintance. If one perceives an autonymous sign, one thereby perceives its referent. Hence, understanding an autonymous sign requires acquaintance with its referent and if one is acquainted with the referent, one thinks of it in the right way (Kripke 2008, pp. 203-4, 212) . However, even if one grants Kripke the assumption that a time is an autonymous designator, there are two problems with the acquaintance requirement.
First, it is implausible (and even counter-systematic) to impose the acquaintance requirement in the case of the first-person pronoun. Frege famously said about the first-
Now everyone is presented to himself in a special and primitive way, in which he is presented to no-one else. So, when Dr. Lauben thinks that he was wounded, he will probably be basing his thinking on this primitive way in which he is presented to himself. And only Dr. Lauben himself can grasp thoughts specified in this way. He cannot communicate a thought he alone can grasp. Therefore, if he now says 'I was wounded', he must use 'I' in a sense which can be grasped by others, perhaps in the sense of 'he who is speaking to you at this moment'; when doing so he utilises the circumstances accompanying his speaking for thought expression. (Frege 1918-19 , p.
[p. 298]; my emphasis and in part my translation)
In soliloquy the first-person pronoun expresses a primitive mode of presentation of the thinker. This mode of presentation cannot be grasped by others. Hence, when Dr Lauben and Leo Peter both use 'I' in thinking about themselves, their uses of 'I' do not need completion.
Precisely because the thinker is given to herself in a special and primitive way, no completion by circumstances is necessary. with it in the right way. 8 The ordered pair <p 1 , 'It is cold here'> does therefore not express the thought completely that one puts forth by uttering 'It is cold here' at p 1 .
Russell tried to avoid the problem that one can stand to the same object in different relations of acquaintance by restricting the range of objects of acquaintance 'to items which were conceived to be so fleeting and insubstantial that it seemed unintelligible to suppose a person might identify the same one twice without knowing that it was the same' (Evans 1982, p. 82) . Such a restriction would, however, make Kripke's view inapplicable to standard indexicals.
To summarize: even if one imposes the acquaintance restriction, speaker, time, and place of utterance cannot be the non-verbal parts of hybrid proper names.
The argument from Frege cases
The conclusion that the time of utterance, etc., is not a non-verbal component of hybrid thought-expressions can also be arrived at by a different route. I will start by rehearsing an argument concerning demonstratives.
When one makes a demonstrative use of a demonstrative pronoun, one normally accompanies one's utterance with an action that makes an object salient, that is, a demonstration. One can make an object salient by pointing to it, glancing at it, and so on. There is a good reason to hold that the demonstration (broadly understood), and not the demonstrated object, is a non-verbal sign that completes the utterance of a sentence 8 The letters 'u 1 ', 'p 1 ' are short-hand for singular terms referring to utterances, times, etc.
9 De Gaynesford (2006, § 65f.) The important point of the example is that the sentence 'This planet is the same as this planet' contains the same complex demonstrative referring to the same referent twice. Hence, the cognitive value of the utterance cannot be explained in terms of the linguistic meaning of the complex demonstrative and/or the demonstrated object. Something needs to be added to the linguistic meaning and the demonstrated object in order to determine the cognitive value of the utterance of a demonstrative. The natural addition seems to be the demonstration accompanying the utterance. A plausible way to understand these demonstrations is to hold that they are non-linguistic signs (see references in Sect. 1). In order to understand the different demonstrations the speaker makes at different times one needs to think of the evening star in different ways. Hence, the utterance under consideration together with the demonstrations expresses an informative truth.
One might object that the utterance of 'This planet is the same as this planet' takes unusually long to complete. Is the reason why it is informative not just that we fail to remember or preserve the original mode of presentation of the evening star over time? No, in assessing the cognitive value of utterances of the form 'a = b' we make the default assumption that speaker and audience are able to preserve the modes of presentation expressed over a span of time. There are independent reasons to hold that one must be able to preserve modes of presentation in memory. For example, carrying out an argument of only modest length requires one to exercise one's preservative memory. Similar reasons are in play here. For instance, one can imagine that Kaplan's slow speaker uses the video camera on his mobile phone to preserve and recreate his visual mode of presentation of the evening star If Rudolf Lingens accepts Dr Lauben's utterance, he is in a position to extend his knowledge.
11 Recanati (1993, p. 82) When Tom understands the utterance he comes to know an informative identity. But in both utterances 'here' has the same linguistic meaning and the context-parameters are constant throughout the utterance. Hence, the thought is not completely expressed by:
<'here', p 1 >^'='^<'here', p 1 > Just like example 3, examples 4 and 5 involve utterances that take more time than many utterances we are used to making. But this seems to be a contingent feature that has nothing to do with the semantics of the words uttered. These examples suggest that demonstratives and indexicals are similar in an important respect. Just as the demonstrated object does not complete the utterance of a sentence containing a demonstrative to the expression of a thought, the relevant context-parameter for an indexical does not complete the utterance of a sentence containing it to the expression of a thought.
We have, therefore, an independent reason to reject the Object View. What is, then, the factor that completes the utterance of a sentence containing an indexical to the expression of a thought?
Using circumstances as means of thought expression
The examples given in the previous section all illustrate Frege's idea that the speaker 'utilises the circumstances accompanying his speaking for thought expression.' When the speaker makes an utterance of 'I was wounded' with communicative intent, she is not using herself to express a thought. Hence, she is not the completing circumstance. But in what sense are the circumstances of utterance used?
We need some background to be able answer this question. For our purposes we can assume that utterances are events in which linguistic signs are uttered. The event of uttering 'The house is on fire!'⎯call it u 1 ⎯takes place at a time, and has a location and a producer.
Knowledge of the linguistic meaning of the sentence uttered in u 1 allows speakers of English to come to know that the utterance says that a contextually salient house is on fire. However, utterances of this kind are causally-nomologically correlated with the speakers who make them: u 1 is therefore a natural sign or an indicator of the presence of a speaker in the house under consideration, although the utterance does not state anything to this effect. Specific features of u 1 are also natural signs or indicators. For example, u 1 is made with a voice that has a particular re-identifiable character. The voice-character is causally-nomologically correlated with a particular speaker. Therefore the voice-character is a natural sign of this particular speaker. Furthermore, in hearing u 1 , we hear the sound coming from a particular place (see Nudds 2010, pp. 90f.) . Hence, u 1 is also a natural sign of the location of its source.
Utterances naturally signify objects, etc., independently of the non-natural linguistic meaning of the sentence uttered.
Utterances not only have natural and non-natural meaning, they are also under the direct intentional control of their speakers. A speaker has a choice not only about what to say, but also when to say it, where to say it, whether he says it in his normal, 'signature' voice or not, and so on (Clark 2004, p. 366) . For example, I can voluntarily make an utterance that carries natural meaning (and is therefore an indicator) and openly intend you to recognize that I have voluntarily made an utterance with this natural meaning. In this case the voluntary making of the utterance gives you a reason to form an attitude about the object of which the utterance is a natural sign (Grice 1989, pp. 293f.) . In this way, natural signs are 'recruited' for the communication of thoughts. The fact that utterances and their features are natural signs, and that utterances can be voluntarily produced, is commonly known among speakers of natural languages. Hence, speakers can count on an audience's appreciation of the fact that their utterances carry natural meaning and therefore make communicative use of natural signs to express thoughts. I take this to be the plausible core of Frege's point that 'certain circumstances accompanying the utterance … are used as means of expressing the thought'.
The circumstances are non-verbal signs either in virtue of the speaker's communicative intention or a convention pertaining to the use of the circumstances.
If the speaker can rely on the existence of a convention, she can unthinkingly and habitually use 'I', 'here', etc., to make herself salient. Speaker and audience mutually understand that the utterance has natural meaning and that one can voluntary make an utterance to refer to an object that is indicated by the utterance. In this situation no special communicative intentions are required. The mutual knowledge will allow them to express or grasp a thought concerning an object by making an utterance that is, among other things, a natural sign of a particular object. We can now also answer the first question raised in section 2. Why should one think of the speaker, time, and location of utterance as contributing to the expression of a thought and not merely as features of the context of utterance? There is no independent reason to take the speaker (place, time) to be part of a thought-expression. Hence, the Object View has no answer to this question. In contrast, there is a clear sense in which the use of the circumstances by the speaker is a non-verbal sign that can be understood. The speaker's use of a circumstance, say, producing an utterance with a distinctive sound, is an action that can be understood. The audience understands the use the speaker makes of a circumstance C if they recognize (i) that, concerning a non-semantic relation R, the speaker intends that they recognize that C stands in R to an object a and (ii) that they come to think of a, in part, because they recognize (i). 13 For example, when uttering 'The race starts now' my audience understands my uttering the sentence at this time if, and only if, they recognize that I make the utterance of 'now' with the intention that they recognize that the utterance and the time at which the race starts are simultaneous, and think of the time because they recognize this intention. Hence, in order to understand my use of the circumstance one needs to think of the intended referent in a particular way. The use of the circumstance itself can, like any other object, for instance, the name 'Hesperus', be thought of in many different ways.
Does it make a difference whether the use of the circumstances is a context-parameter or part of the total utterance? Yes, for the use of the circumstances requires us to grasp a particular mode of presentation and thereby contributes to determining the cognitive value of the utterance. This point surfaces in the examples in section 3; I will return to it in the next section.
The complete sense of an indexical utterance
Let us then grant that the utterance of an indexical sentence is completed to the expression of a thought by the speaker's use of the circumstances of utterance. We need therefore to consider how verbal and non-verbal signs can combine to express a thought. An answer to this question must take into account the fact that indexicals and demonstratives have a context-independent linguistic meaning. One knows this meaning if, and only if, one knows the rule that determines (or at least constrains) the reference of a particular indexical in the context of utterance. A paradigm example of such a rule is (I1). One's knowledge of the linguistic meaning of an indexical enables one to grasp an utterance-relative propositional content that can be true or false (see Perry 1993, p. 247; 2012, pp. 91ff.) . For example, when I hear a recording of 'I need help' I am in a position to know that this utterance is true if, and only if, the producer of the utterance needs help at the time of utterance. In section 2 we saw that this propositional content is not the thought expressed. So how does the propositional content that one grasps in virtue of one's hearing an utterance of an indexical sentence and knowing its linguistic meaning combine with the mode of presentation expressed by the speaker's use of the circumstances of utterance to the expression of a thought?
In her discussion of the informativity of utterances of sentences of the form 'This F = this F', Bezuidenhout (1997, p. 206) one's understanding of an 'I' utterance supposedly consists ('the producer of this utterance'), or an enrichment of it. One arrives at the same conclusion if one allows, like Frege, that sentences containing different indexicals such as 'here' and 'there' can express the same thought if uttered in suitably related contexts (Frege 1918-19, p. 64 [p. 296] ). The indexicals 'here' and 'there' contribute different utterance-relative modes of presentation to a propositional content, yet they can be used to express the same thought (You: 'It is windy here'. I can see where you are and say 'Indeed, it is windy there').
However, if the utterance-relative mode of presentation ('the location of the utterance') is not part of the thought expressed, how is knowledge of context-independent meaning of the indexical related to one's grasping the thought expressed by an utterance of a sentence containing the indexical? For one certainly needs to know the context-independent meaning of an indexical and the utterance-relative mode of presentation it gives rise to in order to understand an utterance containing the indexical in the first place.
Let us work through a particular example in order to answer this question. I will follow Heck (2002, p. 18) in assuming that one knows the context-independent meaning of an indexical sentence if one knows a conditional T-sentence such as:
(∀u, p) (If u is an utterance of 'It is nice here', and if p is the location of u, then u is true iff it is nice at p)
In order to apply the conditional T-sentence to an utterance u 1 of 'It is nice here' made at a particular location, one needs to instantiate its variables 'u' and 'p' with constants and arrive at a non-conditional T-sentence for u 1 : can come to know that its location is over there, but not that its location is the birthplace of Napoleon (the location with the coordinates 41° 55′ 36.12″ N, 8° 44′ 12.84″ E). The audience can use their knowledge that u 1 was made over there as a premiss and arrive at:
u 1 is true iff it is nice over there
In this way the speaker's use of the circumstances of utterance singles out some instantiations of the variables in the conditional T-sentence. The non-conditional T-sentences that contain such instantiations specify the thought expressed by the utterance. In sum: knowledge of linguistic meaning and understanding the speaker's use of the circumstances of utterance both contribute to grasping the thought expressed by an utterance of an indexical sentence. One needs to know the context-independent meaning of the indexical and understand the speaker's use of circumstances accompanying the utterance in order to arrive at the right way of thinking of the referent of the indexical⎯and thereby at the non-conditional T-sentence whose right-hand side specifies the thought expressed.
Two objections
The idea that indexicals are completed on an occasion of utterance by a non-verbal sign 'produced' by the speaker faces two basic objections. I will answer these objections in this section.
First objection:
The previous sections uncovered analogies between demonstratives and indexicals and used them to motivate an extension of Frege's theory of hybrid proper names to (pure) indexicals. But have we not shown too much and eradicated the distinction between indexicals and demonstratives? This difference is supposed to consist in the fact that the linguistic meaning of indexicals is given by a general rule that determines their reference, while demonstratives require, in addition to such a rule, a demonstration to determine their reference (see, for instance, Kripke 2011a, p. 299).
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In the case of indexicals and demonstratives, the audience needs to understand nonverbal and verbal signs to arrive at the right mode of presentation of the referent. Hence, demonstratives and indexicals seem to be in the same boat. If one takes a demonstration to be a pointing or a glance, then demonstrations are just a special case of the use of circumstances of utterances to express thoughts. The more general notion covers both indexicals and demonstratives. Some authors have drawn the conclusion that indexicals are a particular kind of demonstrative. For instance, Bühler called 'I', 'here', and 'now' demonstratives 19 There are independent problems with this way of drawing the distinction. For it is doubtful whether there are any words whose reference is determined only by a general linguistic rules. (See Nunberg 1993, pp. 11ff.; Bezuidenhout 1997, pp. 216-17; and Roberts 1996, Sect. 3 on 'I'.) I will set these aside for the purposes of the discussion.
(Zeigeworte). 20 De Gaynesford 2006 is, to my knowledge, the most detailed attempt so far to argue that the first-person pronoun is a demonstrative.
Response: There is still an important distinction between indexicals and demonstratives.
Knowledge of the linguistic meaning of demonstratives consists in knowledge that a demonstration fixes the reference of a use of a demonstrative (Kaplan 1989, p. 490) . In contrast, the linguistic rules for indexicals do not make use of the notion of demonstration.
For instance, you do not fail in your understanding of the English word 'here' if you do not know which use of circumstances completes it. Yet, you fail to grasp the thought expressed by an utterance that contains 'here' if you do not understand the use of the circumstances.
Demonstratives and indexicals are distinguished in virtue of the reference rules they encode.
Second objection: Indexicals and demonstratives are used in novels, autobiographies, travel reports, and telephone conversations without obvious demonstrations or other uses of circumstances. For instance, in an autobiography the indexical 'I' will be used frequently.
Here the mere wording of a sentence with an indexical (demonstrative) seems to express a thought. How can one understand such inscriptions of indexicals on the assumption that an utterance of an indexical sentence is completed by a non-verbal sign to a complete thoughtexpression? Clearly the author does not accompany his utterance with non-verbal signs.
Response: In such cases the role of the completing circumstance of utterance is taken by explicit or implicit scene setting. 21 For example, imagine you receive the following postcard:
Verbier, 14.12.2011
Hello Darlings, I am having the time of my life here. The weather has been great, the men so charming. I have to dash now⎯the next lift is leaving in a sec.
XXX Caggie
From the information on the card one can piece together a description of the circumstances of utterance of the inscribed sentences. The state of affairs described⎯that Caggie Dunlop is in Verbier on 14 December 2011⎯is the context of utterance for the indexical sentences inscribed. Hence, we understand that 'now' and 'I' were inscribed by Caggie on 14
December 2011 in Verbier. These indexicals were inscribed by Caggie to draw our attention to features of the context of utterance that she needs to describe to us.
Conclusion
Can one hold on to the idea that non-verbal signs complete the utterance of a hybrid proper name and do justice to the Fregean idea that both indexicals and demonstratives are hybrid proper names? Yes, in both cases uses of circumstances help to express a thought. of hybrid proper names can and should be extended to indexicals, and so extended it contributes to our understanding of indexical communication.
